This article explores the legalisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) and its increasing use of sanctions. It argues that the breadth and depth of the numerous sanctions regimes in place shows that European foreign policy is not merely an aspiration but produces law and legal processes which share similarities with those in the rest of the EU's legal order. Further, the article examines the extent to which non-EU Member States in Europe have aligned themselves with EU sanctions. The argument is made that this is evidence not only of Europeanisation, but also crucially of a legalised foreign policy which has allowed Europewide, EU-led foreign policy to emerge.
INTRODUCTION
demonstrated both a strong willingness and ability to impose sanctions on third states, and natural and legal persons. These have been both as a result of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the EU's own autonomous initiatives. There are now over 30 active sanctions regimes in place. Sanctions are both a foreign policy tool and a legal instrument, capable in some circumstances of bring challenged in the courts and following a (albeit unique) legislative process. Sanctions often connect foreign policy actorness with the EU's considerable economic weight and in many cases have become the 'go to' remedy at the European level. The extent to which sanctions have been imposed, or at the very least discussed in the Council, mean that it is little exaggeration to say that the CFSP has become oriented towards sanctions as an appropriate response to global or regional problems.
I argue that the EU's use of sanctions has contributed to a two-way process by which the use of sanctions has facilitated the legalisation process to the extent that the post-Lisbon CFSP is centred on the use of sanctions as representing a particularly legalised form of instrument. The legal and procedural formalism associated with sanction regimes brings these phenomena within the scope and development of foreign policy in spite of assertions by some Member States that the CFSP is outside the scope of 'law'. At the same time, the legalisation of CFSP has in turn allowed sanctions regimes to be developed in a more sophisticated way in the Council which explains their diversity, both geographical and substantive.
In the second part of the article, I explore two consequences of the legalisation of the EU's foreign policy which have emerged via the use of sanctions. The first is that the measures employed by the EU but often refers to suspension of treaty obligations, which is beyond the scope of analysis here. See (Routledge, 2011) extent to which the EU has developed its use of sanctions as a core foreign policy tool and the range of third states and situations to which they apply are a success in terms of meeting some of the Treaty-based foreign policy goals. Second, the extent to which nonMember States of the EU in Europe have adopted the same sanctions -and publicly aligned themselves with the EU -demonstrates that the EU has made great strides in forging a European foreign policy, and one based on Law. This speaks to the argument that EU foreign policy is not merely words, but 'actions' too. Further, it fulfils a Treatybased goal for the EU to promote its values, particularly with neighbouring countries.
THE PROGRESSIVE 'LEGALISATION' OF EU FOREIGN POLICY
Legalisation refers to two interconnected phenomena. First, it refers to a process by which gradual cooperation between actors over time develops into an institutionalised arena, which abides by a set of rules which the members regard as being bound by (whether or not there is any enforcement mechanism). 3 In this respect, legalisation thus represents a general transformation from the informal to the formal. Second, legalisation can refer to a set of characteristics defined according to conditions of obligation, precision and delegation. 4 That is to say, institutions can be more or less legalised, depending on the extent to which they abide by sets of rules or commitments (obligation), whether these are unambiguous (precision) and if authority has been granted to make decisions and enforce them (delegation). 5 The social context and social practices 3 In the EU context, this has been used in particular by ME Smith, of law are brought to the fore in this vision of legalisation. 6 Legalisation in this respect could be seen as akin to institutionalisation, and indeed I have argued elsewhere that the CFSP represents an institutionalised form of cooperation. 7 But legalisation is used here specifically because of the distinction it makes in identifying the transition from the informal to the formal. Since sanctions are formal instruments which produce 'hard' legal effects, it is possible to characterise the whole of the CFSP as being 'legalised' due to the central role in which the process of imposing sanctions plays, particularly in the postLisbon era. Similarly, there are parallels with the literature on Europeanisation, though this often relates more closely to the domestic changes in the Member States who are engaged in the integration process than the EU institutional level changes. 8 Foreign policy occupies and unusual place within the legal and institutional system of the EU. The EU's 'new legal order' 9 was established very early in the integration process, but even as the legal system of the EU matured, the drafters of the Treaty of Maastricht deliberately kept foreign policy away from the mainstream legal order. Testing the extent to which European foreign policy has been legalised requires an analysis of the extent to which actors (Member States) are capable of agreeing measures, on what subject matters, how regularly and whether they believe themselves to be creating 'law'. Although the legalisation could be achieved merely by the 'internal' rules of behaviour established by the members, the legalisation can also be measured by the extent of which its external 6 Though see also Following the Treaty of Lisbon, which attempted to promote greater coherence between the EU's competences in the external sphere, the 'pillar' structure was largely abandoned, and the Union -rather than just the Community -gained legal personality in its own right. 24 Whilst the single legal personality ended the confusing separateness at the heart of the EU institutional arrangements, the CFSP itself remains distinct from the general legal order of the Union, in a manner which I have characterised elsewhere as being 'ring-fenced'. However, despite the Treaty-level 'ring-fencing' of the CFSP, the practice of European foreign policy is not immune from increasing legalisation. The objectives and principles governing the conduct of external relations, including the CFSP, were brought within the same section of the Treaty.
33
The aim was to promote coherence in the EU's external relations across its spheres of activity, even if different objectives may apply to different dimensions. 34 The institutional framework, whilst prioritising the role of the Nevertheless, against a backdrop of institutional developments which makes the CFSP more legalised than it is often thought to be, the instruments available to the institutions under the CFSP 41 do not enjoy the formal enforceability provided by legislative acts. Article 24 (1) TEU explicitly states that, 'The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded' within the CFSP, 42 distinguishing them from the 'legal acts of the Union' defined in Article 288 TFEU.
As such, it is difficult to argue that the obligation dimension of legalisation 43 has been adequately met, that is to say, by the agreement of binding (in a formal sense) rules.
However, examining the evolution of the CFSP since the Treaty of Lisbon in particular reveals that sanctions are increasingly prominent its field and scope of activity which, it is worth recalling, covers 'all aspects' of foreign policy. 44 The argument here is that the Article 24 (1) TEU: "The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the post-Lisbon CFSP represents a step further of legalisation given the importance of sanctions as a lynchpin of the contemporary CFSP. To be clear: it is not that the instruments under the CFSP can be seen in exactly the same way as the legal acts mentioned in Article 288 TFEU, but rather that the practice of negotiating the CFSP measures which will be mirrored in enforceable legislation has exerted a strong influence on the legalisation process. To support this point, it is first necessary to explore how the current sanctions regime as an integral part of the CFSP came about. measures 'have been adopted in the exercise of national competence in matters of foreign and security policy, they must respect the Community rules adopted under the common commercial policy'.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU SANCTIONS REGIMES
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The result is therefore that even if the CFSP measure itself must necessarily be With this in mind, it it less likely that the logics change when discussing matters, making the 'political' and the 'legal' an artificial distinction in terms of both substance and institutional competences. That is not to say that the same outcomes will always be reached for a foreign policy issue under discussion within the CFSP. Rather, a view that a 'political' CFSP operates in isolation from potential 'legal' outcomes becomes increasingly hollow, and especially in the post-Lisbon era. As Wessel explains, 'given the dynamics of the Lisbon approach to consolidating the EU's external relations, it will be increasingly difficult to deny a link with other policies, allowing the Court to take CFSPdimensions along in its assessment of those policies'.
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In short, sanctions are a key foreign policy tool at the disposal of the EU and underpinned by legal processes. The division between the CFSP as representing the 'core' of the EU's foreign policy and the rest of the EU's legal order is not indicative of an absolute unwillingness to bestow on foreign policy the procedural qualities provided by law. Moreover, the iterative processes of legal challenges, redrafting and reissues of sanctions demonstrates that this is a highly-legalised domain. 
EXPLORING THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF EU SANCTIONS
Considering the legalisation of the EU's foreign policy must inevitably go hand in hand with examining the context of the cases where sanctions have been used. One might say that this is a chicken and egg situation, i.e. did the legalisation occur as a result of the use of sanctions, or does the legalisation of the foreign policy facilitate the use of sanctions as a lynchpin of EU foreign policy? The argument here is that it is a two-way process: the nature of sanctions themselves as being more than a symbolic gesture necessitates a legal approach in working out the detail of the sanctions themselves, their likely effects on the third country/individual and the impact on and interface with other EU policies.
Conversely, the increase since the Treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon in the instances of imposing sanctions and their variety in substance and depth shows that the EU's extensive use of sanctions -or even merely discussing whether they should be applied or not -is evidence of a legalised foreign policy machinery capable of taking such decisions and applying them. This section explores the nature and diversity of the sanctions regimes currently in place to support this point.
As of mid-2015, the EU operates 33 sanctions regimes. All but two of these regimes are in place towards third countries: 11 of the target countries are in sub-Saharan decision (which did not concern sanctions) the Court held that a minimum of democratic and judicial scrutiny applies to the CFSP. 108 The result of the decision confirms the view that the CFSP is more integrated into the legal order of the EU than can be assumed from some of the Treaty provisions. The Court has a further opportunity to review the compatibility of CFSP measures and sanctions and judicial oversight in the pending Rosneft case.
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The question of whether sanctions are effective in terms of achieving goals and outcomes is beyond the scope of the discussion here. Existing literature on this topic holds that sanctions can be an effective tool, but this is also context-specific. Whether effective or not -or whether motivated by values or economic/security interests, the argument here is that the discussion and eventual decision to impose sanctions is 
AN EU-LED 'EUROPEAN' FOREIGN POLICY
This section takes the argument one step further and suggests that the development of use of sanctions by the EU has had a secondary effect, namely the opportunity for wider leadership in the European neighbourhood via the CFSP and its sanctions regimes. In practice, this development has opened up the possibility for 14 non-EU states in Europe 
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to demonstrate that the foreign policy of the EU as encapsulated by the Common Foreign and Security Policy is far from a domain in which there is no 'law'. Rather, through a process of legalisation, the 'otherness' of the CFSP is less profound than is often assumed. With the increase in the imposition of traditional and 'smart' sanctions via autonomous measures and counter-terrorism listings, the EU has 'largely occupied the field' 131 of activity vis-à-vis the Member States, and of the CFSP itself. This is a remarkable state of affairs when one considers that neither sanctions nor the CFSP were assumed to be anywhere close to the core of the EU's external activity at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht. 131 Eeckhout, see note 46 above, p 546
The developments since the Treaty of Lisbon in terms of using sanctions as a cornerstone of foreign policy, and in particular towards Russia, demonstrates that the EU has succeeded in tying together its economic weight with its search for an international role. As part of the CFSP, the increasingly sophisticated use of sanctions and their application to situations around the globe is evidence of a symbiotic relationship:
sanctions sustain and provide a backbone to the CFSP whilst the legalised underpinnings of the CFSP provide the institutional context in which sanctions can be discussed and agreed. In turn, this creates the expectation that sanctions -and thus foreign policyrepresent something the EU can do which has practical effects in fostering change.
As a consequence, the CFSP should be understood less as the 'other' and more the 'normal' within the EU's institutional arrangements and even its legal order.
Furthermore, the CFSP merits continued scholarship and attention from lawyers in terms of how the legal norms are created: this is particularly the case given the success the EU has experienced in 'exporting' the CFSP to neighbouring countries and forging what should be seen as a genuine Europe-wide sanctions regime and, hence, foreign policy.
